College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media

Faculty and Deans

1992

Barnhill v. Johnson and Payment by Check on the
Eve of Bankruptcy: Implications for the Real Estate
Attorney
Lynda L. Butler
William & Mary Law School, llbutl@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Butler, Lynda L., "Barnhill v. Johnson and Payment by Check on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Implications for the Real Estate Attorney"
(1992). Popular Media. 58.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media/58

Copyright c 1992 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media

BARNHILL V. JOHNSON AND PAYMENT BY CHECK ON THE EVE OF
BANKRUPTCY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REAL ESTATE ATTORNEY
by Lynda L. Butler·
For parties to a real estate transaction, one of the critical aspects of the transaction is
the transfer of value between the parties. The success of the transaction - not to mention the
ability of attorneys to meet their statutory and professional responsibilities - depends on the
certainty of the transfer of value. l In the 1992 decision Barnhill v. Johnson/ the United States
Supreme Court clarified that, for purposes of determining whether a debtor made a transfer
within the 9O-day period prior to bankruptcy, a transfer made by check occurs on the date the
check is honored and not on the date of delivery or receipt. The Court's decision reverses
judicial decisions favoring the date of receipf and thus increases the risk of nonpayment at
least slightly.
The dispute in Johnson centered around checks that were delivered before but honored
during the 90-day period preceding the filing of bankruptcy. Under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, the trustee for the bankrupt estate may recover transfers of the debtor's property made
within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing. 4 Section 101(54) defines "transfer" broadly to include
"every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing
of or parting with property or with an interest in property."s In resisting recovery of the check
payment, petitioner Barnhill argued that a § 101(54) transfer occurred on the date he received ·
the check, which was outside the 9O-day period. As support, he relied on the breadth of the
definition of transfer and argued that, at the very least, delivery of a check constituted a
conditional transfer.6

·Ms. Butler is a member of the Board of Governors of the Real Property Section of the
Virginia State Bar and a Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary.
lFor a discussion of an attorney's obligations under the Virginia Wet Settlement Act, see
Butler, The Wet Settlement Act and the Problem of Delayed Disbursements, 6 REAL PROPERTY
SECTION NEWSLETIER 13 (May 1986).
2112 S.Ct. 1386 (1992).
3For some examples, see P. ALcES, THE LAw OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS
§ 6.02[5][b], at 6-24 n.76 (1989).
411 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. 1992).

SId. § 101(54).
6112 S.Ct. at 1390.
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In rejecting the petitioner's arguments, the Court focused on principles of commercial
and bankruptcy law.1 Under commercial law principles, mere "receipt of a check gives the
recipient no right in the funds held by the bank on the drawer's account. "s "[U]ntil the
moment of honor the debtor retains full control over disposition of the account and the account
remains subject to a variety of actions by third parties. ,,9 Numerous events occurring between
delivery and presentment could result in dishonor.1o Additionally, § 3-409 of the Uniform
Commercial Code clearly states that a check is not an assignment of any funds available for
payment. ll While the creditor/payee might have a cause of action against the debtor/drawer
once the check is delivered/ 2 this interest could not, in the Court's view, be characterized as
an interest in the debtor's property, the account with the drawee bank. A § 101(54) transfer of
part of the debtor's interest in the bank funds would not occur until the date of honor. 13
Nor was the Court persuaded by petitioner's reliance on the accompanying legislative
history for § 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. That legislative history indicated that "'[p]ayment
is considered to be made when the check is delivered for purposes of sections 547(c)(1) and
(2). >1114 In rejecting petitioner's argument, the Court noted that the legislative history applied
only to § 547(c) and not to § 547(b), the section containing the 90-day preference rule. As
the Court explained, § 547(c) "establishes various exceptions to § 547(b),s general rule
permitting recovery of preferential transfers.'115 These exceptions "are designed to encourage

1The Court examined rights and duties under state commercial law even though the task
of determining the meaning and timing of transfers is a matter of federal law because the
Code's definition of "transfer" includes references to "property" and "interest[s] in property."
In the absence of controlling federal law, property and interests in property are, in the words
of the Court, "creatures of state law." Id. at 1389.

SId. at 1390.
91d. at 1391.
10ld. at 1390. Examples given by the Court included an account closing, a third-party lien,
and wrongful dishonor. Id.
llU.c.C § 3-409(1). In his treatise on fraudulent transactions, Professor Peter Alces prefers
the § 3-409 rationale, noting that the Court's interpretation of a payee's interests in a check is
"not a completely accurate view of the commercial paper law." P. ALcEs, supra note 3, at S623 (Supp. No.2, 1992). As he points out, "from the time a payee receives a check, the payee
has a sufficient interest in it to support a conversion against someone who thereafter takes an
action inconsistent with the payee's title to the instrument." Id.
12See 112 S.Ct. at 1390 & n.8.

131d. at 1390.
141d. at 1391 (quoting 124 Congo Rec. 32400, 34000 (1978)).
15112 S.Ct. at 1391.
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creditors to continue to deal with troubled debtors on normal business terms by obviating any
worry that a subsequent bankruptcy filing might require the creditor to disgorge as a preference
an earlier received payment."16 Because of "this specialized purpose," the Court saw no reason
to apply the legislative history of § 547(c) to § 547(b).17
The dissenting opinion of Justices Stevens and Blackmun maintained that a § 101(54)
transfer of property "occurs on the date the check is delivered to the transferee, provided that
the check is honored within 10 days."ls According to the dissent, this approach is consistent
with established commercial practices l9 and with § 101(54)'s broad definition of transfer, which
includes '''every mode, ... absolute or conditional, ... of ... parting with property."'20
Further, the dissent stressed that "[n]ormally ... the same terms have the same meaning in
different sections of the same statute."21
Because Johnson involved ordinary checks, the implications of the decision for real
estate transactions involving certified and cashier's checks are unclear. On the one hand, both
types of checks involve the same timing problem raised by ordinary checks; a gap in time still
exists between a check's issuance and payment. Further, although the drawee bank is primarily
liable on certified and cashier's checks,22 the commercial law concept of honor requires more
than acceptance or primary contract liability. Under 1-201(21) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, "honor" means "to payor to accept and pay."23 On the other hand, certified and
cashier's checks arguably give the creditor/payee a claim against the debtor's bank or account
sufficient to transfer a property interest under § 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code; with a
certified check this claim arguably arises because the drawee bank has accepted the obligation

16Id.
17Id. Although the Court does not address the issue of timing under § 547(c), one possible
implication of its discussion of the legislative history argument is that the Court would use the
date of delivery for purposes of § 547(c).
1SId. at 1392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19Id. Commercial practices identified by Stevens include the practice of treating the date
of delivery as the date of payment when a check is subsequently honored by the drawee bank
and the tax rule allowing deductions of expenses paid by checks that are delivered by
December 31 but that are not honored until the next calendar year. [d.
2°Id. (parts of quoted definition omitted) (quoting § 101(54)).
21112 S.Ct. at 1393.

22See U.C.C. § 3-413(1); Butler, supra note 1, at 16-17. For a discussion of the legal
implications of various methods of remittance, see Alces, Media of Remittance in the Evolving
Payment System, 12 REAL PROPERTY SECTION NEWSLETTER 14 (Nov. 1991).
23U.C.C. § 1-201(21).
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to honor the check as presented,24 and with a cashier's check it arises because the drawee bank
is also the drawer, a party having direct contract liability on the check.2S In Johnson the Court
stressed that, n[i]n the absence of any right against the bank or account,n the recipient of a
check received no interest in the debtor's property until honor of the check.26 Certified and
cashier's checks arguably give the recipient such a claim against the drawee bank.
Resolution of the timing issue raised by certified and cashier's checks is important.
Because real estate closings generally involve one-time payments, they would not otherwise fall
within the § 547(c)(2) exception for transfers made in the ordinary course of business. 27 In any
event, the Johnson decision makes it clear that the sooner checks are honored, the better.

24See id. § 3-410(1).
2SSee id. § 3-413(1).

26 112 S.Ct. at 1391.
27Mortgage payments made on a long-term basis generally should fall with the ordinary
course of business exception unless the form of payment suddenly changes. See P. ALCEs,
supra note 3, § 6.03[2][a], at 6-45 (1989) & S6-36 (Supp. No.2, 1992); see also id. § 6.03[2]
(1989 & Supp. No.2, 1992) (discussing the ordinary course of business exception). A
discussion of the implications of § 547(c) for real estate transactions is beyond the scope of
this article. See generally id. § 6.03 (discussing the § 547(c) exceptions).
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